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24th European Congress of Psychiatry / European Psychiatry 33S (2016) S349–S805

S637

EV900

Wittengstein’s private language

argument: Does it pass the

schizophrenic mind challenge?

G. Santos

Hospital Magalhães Lemos, Psiquiatria, Porto, Portugal

Introduction

The private language argument was introduced by

Ludwig Wittengstein in his

Philosophical Investigations

(1953). For

Wittengstein, language is a rule-governed activity and a language

in principle unintelligible to anyone but its originating user is

impossible, as even the originator would fail to establish mean-

ings for its putative signs. The private language argument is of

paramount significance in modern debates about the nature of

language and mind and continues to be disputed. Language dis-

order has been described since the first accounts of Schizophrenia.

Multiple studies have reported anomalies at multiple levels of lan-

guage processing, from lexical and syntactic particularities to the

discourse field, as well as structural and functional abnormalities

in brain regions that are involved with language perception and

processing.

Objectives and aims

We aim to critically assess theWittengstein’s

argument in the light of recent developments in neuroscience of

language.

Results and conclusions

We conclude that in some patients

diagnosed with schizophrenia, presenting a significant language

impairment, one can infer a dysfunctional process, in which the

language becomes progressively more private and the meaning of

utterances harder to ascertain in the realm of interpersonal com-

munication. The privatization of language might contribute to the

social cognition deficits and the so-called negative symptomatol-

ogy of these patients.

Disclosure of interest

The authors have not supplied their decla-

ration of competing interest.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2016.01.1885

EV901

The mechanistic property cluster view

of mental disorder: A tenable form of

non-reductionist realism?

D. Strijbos

Dimence, centre for developmental disorders, Deventer, Netherlands

Introduction

The question what mental disorders are lies at the

heart of the philosophy of psychiatry. In search of a valid taxonomy

of mental disorders, it is a question that needs a proper answer.

In recent work, Kenneth Kendler et al. (2011) have put forward

the “mechanistic property cluster” (MPC) model of mental disor-

der. On this view, mental disorders are mechanistically mediated

clusters of multi-level (bio-psycho-social) properties. Kendler et al.

present the MPC-model as a non-reductionist form of realism –

realist because it tries to account for mental disorders in terms of

the causal structure of the natural world, non-reductionist because

it views mental disorders as clusters of multi-level properties. For

the project of psychiatric nosology, such non-reductionist realism

would be a great step forward and indeed preferable to pragmatist

and constructionist models of mental disorder.

Objective

To critically assess the MPC-model in light of argu-

ments against realism about mental disorders presented in the

philosophical literature.

Aims

To achieve a proper understanding of the ontology of men-

tal disorders that can inform future psychiatric nosology.

Methods

Literature study and conceptual analysis.

Results

Despite appearances, the MPC-view fails to take into

account the various (societal, practical, scientific) values that

determine the delineation of mental disorders. It ultimately faces

philosophical problems similar to those of more reductionist forms

of realism.

Conclusions

The MPC-model fails as a realist model of mental

disorders. Its non-reductionism, however, is an important contri-

bution to theories of explanation in psychiatry.

Disclosure of interest

The authors have not supplied their decla-

ration of competing interest.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2016.01.1886

EV902

On the Carlos Castilla Del Pino “Axiom

of behavioral significance” and its

relevance in philosophy of psychiatry:

The unification of clinical

neuroscience

M. Vargas

Complejo Asistencial de Segovia, Grupo de Investigación en

Neurociencia Clínica de Segovia GINCS, Psychiatry, Segovia, Spain

Carlos Castilla del Pino (1922-2009) was a Spanish psychiatrist

and essayist with a wide work ranging from neuropsychiatry to

social psychiatry. His essays include interesting psychopathologi-

cal, anthropological and semiotic ideas.

The “axiom of behavioural significance” proposes that human

behaviour is not an objective event but a meaningful act. As the

objective of human behaviour is relation between human beings,

it must be studied only under this communicative perspective.

Based in this axiomatic approach of Castilla del Pino, some argu-

ments of interest to philosophy of psychiatry will be exposed:

– Mind is based in language and language is a communicative acts

system in need of a dialogic community, namely, in need of a group

of interacting brains. So, referring to the “brains-mind problem”

is proposed to be preferred instead of referring to the “brain-mind

problem”. Mind is a language-based emergent property of the social

group, not a property of a single brain.

– The intention of human behaviour and the content of mental

subjective phenomena should not be taken as a sign of any brain

disease. Human behavior andmental representations always refers

to a social group and a social context, not to a single brain. The

only disease indicators we can take as disease signs are the formal

aspects of behaviour and mind contents, as disexecutive syndrome

or mental automatism are.

– As a corollary, it is proposed that neurology and psychiatry do not

have any epistemic difference, leading to defence the unification of

clinical neuroscience.

Disclosure of interest

The authors have not supplied their decla-

ration of competing interest.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2016.01.1887

EV903

The other, role theory, key elements

on the development of one-self and

psychopathology

Associate prof F.I.Z.

, Dr. C.Z. , Dr. J.V.

Clinica Psiquiátrica Universitaria, Universidad de Chile, Psychiatry,

Santiago, Chile

Corresponding author.

We plan to analyze the psychological and sociological concepts

of the other and the role theory. We would describe the roles in

psychopathology differentiating between the identity of the role

and the identity of oneself and its entailment with the other, with

respect to the development of the individual and its difficulties in

the acquisition of roles, leading to different clinical entities. These

pathologies show phenomenological differences observed in clin-

ical situations such as schizophrenia, depression, bipolar disease,

personality disorders and in psychopathological manifestations of

epilepsy. We analyze the difficulties schizophrenic patients have

in assuming roles, as well as in the recognition of “the other”,