European Psychiatry - Volume 33 - March 2016

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24th European Congress of Psychiatry / European Psychiatry 33S (2016) S349–S805 S637
EV900
Wittengstein’s private language
argument: Does it pass the
schizophrenic mind challenge?
G. Santos
Hospital Magalhães Lemos, Psiquiatria, Porto, Portugal
Introduction The private language argument was introduced by
Ludwig Wittengstein in his Philosophical Investigations (1953). For
Wittengstein, language is a rule-governed activity and a language
in principle unintelligible to anyone but its originating user is
impossible, as even the originator would fail to establish mean-
ings for its putative signs. The private language argument is of
paramount significance in modern debates about the nature of
language and mind and continues to be disputed. Language dis-
order has been described since the first accounts of Schizophrenia.
Multiple studies have reported anomalies at multiple levels of lan-
guage processing, from lexical and syntactic particularities to the
discourse field, as well as structural and functional abnormalities
in brain regions that are involved with language perception and
processing.
Objectives and aims We aim to critically assess theWittengstein’s
argument in the light of recent developments in neuroscience of
language.
Results and conclusions We conclude that in some patients
diagnosed with schizophrenia, presenting a significant language
impairment, one can infer a dysfunctional process, in which the
language becomes progressively more private and the meaning of
utterances harder to ascertain in the realm of interpersonal com-
munication. The privatization of language might contribute to the
social cognition deficits and the so-called negative symptomatol-
ogy of these patients.
Disclosure of interest The authors have not supplied their decla-
ration of competing interest.
EV901
The mechanistic property cluster view
of mental disorder: A tenable form of
non-reductionist realism?
D. Strijbos
Dimence, centre for developmental disorders, Deventer, Netherlands
Introduction The question what mental disorders are lies at the
heart of the philosophy of psychiatry. In search of a valid taxonomy
of mental disorders, it is a question that needs a proper answer.
In recent work, Kenneth Kendler et al. (2011) have put forward
the “mechanistic property cluster” (MPC) model of mental disor-
der. On this view, mental disorders are mechanistically mediated
clusters of multi-level (bio-psycho-social) properties. Kendler et al.
present the MPC-model as a non-reductionist form of realism –
realist because it tries to account for mental disorders in terms of
the causal structure of the natural world, non-reductionist because
it views mental disorders as clusters of multi-level properties. For
the project of psychiatric nosology, such non-reductionist realism
would be a great step forward and indeed preferable to pragmatist
and constructionist models of mental disorder.
Objective To critically assess the MPC-model in light of argu-
ments against realism about mental disorders presented in the
philosophical literature.
Aims To achieve a proper understanding of the ontology of men-
tal disorders that can inform future psychiatric nosology.
Methods Literature study and conceptual analysis.
Results Despite appearances, the MPC-view fails to take into
account the various (societal, practical, scientific) values that
determine the delineation of mental disorders. It ultimately faces
philosophical problems similar to those of more reductionist forms
of realism.
Conclusions The MPC-model fails as a realist model of mental
disorders. Its non-reductionism, however, is an important contri-
bution to theories of explanation in psychiatry.
Disclosure of interest The authors have not supplied their decla-
ration of competing interest.
EV902
On the Carlos Castilla Del Pino “Axiom
of behavioral significance” and its
relevance in philosophy of psychiatry:
The unification of clinical
neuroscience
M. Vargas
Complejo Asistencial de Segovia, Grupo de Investigación en
Neurociencia Clínica de Segovia GINCS, Psychiatry, Segovia, Spain
Carlos Castilla del Pino (1922-2009) was a Spanish psychiatrist
and essayist with a wide work ranging from neuropsychiatry to
social psychiatry. His essays include interesting psychopathologi-
cal, anthropological and semiotic ideas.
The “axiom of behavioural significance” proposes that human
behaviour is not an objective event but a meaningful act. As the
objective of human behaviour is relation between human beings,
it must be studied only under this communicative perspective.
Based in this axiomatic approach of Castilla del Pino, some argu-
ments of interest to philosophy of psychiatry will be exposed:
– Mind is based in language and language is a communicative acts
system in need of a dialogic community, namely, in need of a group
of interacting brains. So, referring to the “brains-mind problem”
is proposed to be preferred instead of referring to the “brain-mind
problem”. Mind is a language-based emergent property of the social
group, not a property of a single brain.
– The intention of human behaviour and the content of mental
subjective phenomena should not be taken as a sign of any brain
disease. Human behavior andmental representations always refers
to a social group and a social context, not to a single brain. The
only disease indicators we can take as disease signs are the formal
aspects of behaviour and mind contents, as disexecutive syndrome
or mental automatism are.
– As a corollary, it is proposed that neurology and psychiatry do not
have any epistemic difference, leading to defence the unification of
clinical neuroscience.
Disclosure of interest The authors have not supplied their decla-
ration of competing interest.
EV903
The other, role theory, key elements
on the development of one-self and
psychopathology
Associate prof F.I.Z. ∗, Dr. C.Z. , Dr. J.V.
Clinica Psiquiátrica Universitaria, Universidad de Chile, Psychiatry,
Santiago, Chile
∗ Corresponding author.
We plan to analyze the psychological and sociological concepts
of the other and the role theory. We would describe the roles in
psychopathology differentiating between the identity of the role
and the identity of oneself and its entailment with the other, with
respect to the development of the individual and its difficulties in
the acquisition of roles, leading to different clinical entities. These
pathologies show phenomenological differences observed in clin-
ical situations such as schizophrenia, depression, bipolar disease,
personality disorders and in psychopathological manifestations of
epilepsy. We analyze the difficulties schizophrenic patients have
in assuming roles, as well as in the recognition of “the other”,