Table of Contents Table of Contents
Previous Page  639 / 812 Next Page
Information
Show Menu
Previous Page 639 / 812 Next Page
Page Background

24th European Congress of Psychiatry / European Psychiatry 33S (2016) S349–S805

S635

will be reviewed and some conclusions regarding the difficulties

and limitations of this concept will be highlighted.

Conclusions

(a) Hacking’s “Historical Ontology” methodology

suggest that attempts to differentiate Bipolar I and Bipolar II dis-

orders by severity will always risk misdiagnosis, coinciding with

Gordon Parker’s

state of the art

conclusions; (b) the emergence of

the man-made Bipolar II construct appears to be one of the end

products – an unintended consequence – of Nancy Andreasen’s

“Death of phenomenology in America”.

Disclosure of interest

The authors have not supplied their decla-

ration of competing interest.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2016.01.1878

EV894

From DSM-5 to anthropopsychiatry:

(Re)search for a renewed psychiatry

M. Calmeyn

Loppem Zedelgem, Belgium

Introduction

“DSM is the Esperanto of psychiatry”. Let it be? If

DSM is to be considered as a symptom of contemporary psychiatry,

the time for a change has come.

Objectives

An important candidate towards an in depth move is

anthropopsychiatry. Anthropopsychiatry is the original confluence

of classical psychiatry, philosophy (phenomenology and structural-

ism) and psychoanalysis. An elegant evidence-based investigation

(Roelandts and Schotte, 1999) exemplifies its importance.

Methods

A search in literature with authors like Frances, Edward

Shorter, Vanheule, Verhaeghe and Feys reveals several flaws in the

DSM construction. A four-fold analysis by means of the episte-

mological terms nosography, nosotaxy, nosology and nosognosy

makes clear that the DSM is a thinking under construction, cultur-

ally “child of its time”. The concerns from the British Psychological

Society and the objection by the NIMH are first moves towards

another psychiatric classification, and consequently another vision

on psychiatric theory and praxis.

Results

Foregoing reveals anthropopsychiatry as an appeal

towards present day psychiatry. It grounds modern psychiatry as

an “autological” psychiatry (Kronfeld) with its own conceptual-

ization and not “heterological” as an assemblage of all kinds of

influences coming from neurobiological sources and human psy-

chological findings.

Conclusion

Anthropopsychiatry can be considered to be a seri-

ous candidate in the development towards a renewed psychiatry

evidently based on clinical anthropology (Geyskens).

Disclosure of interest

The authors have not supplied their decla-

ration of competing interest.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2016.01.1879

EV895

Mental health stigma: What’s been

done? Where to go?

P. Macedo

, A. Fornelos , A.R. Figueiredo , S. Nunes , M. Silva ,

F. Veríssimo

CHTMAD, Departamento de Psiquiatria e Saúde Mental, Vila Real,

Portugal

Corresponding author.

Introduction

Negative attitudes towards psychiatric patients still

exists in our society. Persons suffering from mental illness fre-

quently encounter public stigma and may internalize it leading

to self-stigma. Discrimination occurs across many aspects of eco-

nomic and social existence. It may represent a barrier for patients to

receive appropriate care. Many anti-stigma campaigns have been

taken to decrease people’s prejudice, but its effects are not well

documented.

Objective

To characterize anti-stigma initiatives and its effects on

diminishing negative consequences of stigma.

Methods

Bibliographical research on PubMed using keywords

“stigma” and “mental illness”.

Results

Despite several approaches to eradicate stigma, it shows

a surprising consistency in population levels. It was expected

that focus on education would decrease stigma levels. The same

was expected following concentration on the genetic causation

of pathology. Most studies have revealed that education has lit-

tle value and endorsing genetic attributions has led to a greater

pessimism on the efficacy of mental health services, sense of per-

manence and guilty feelings within the family.

Conclusion

Public stigma has had amajor impact onmany people

with mental illness, especially when leading to self-stigma, inter-

fering with various aspects in life, including work, housing, health

care, social life and self-esteem. As Goffman elucidated, stigma is

fundamentally a social phenomenon rooted in social relationships

and shaped by the culture and structure of society. Social inclusion

has been pointed as a potential direction for change.

Disclosure of interest

The authors have not supplied their decla-

ration of competing interest.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2016.01.1880

EV896

Veiling existence with clothing

O. Molina-Andreu

1 ,

, A. González-Rodríguez

2

,

H. Pelegrina Cetrán

3

1

Hospital Universitari Mútua de Terrassa, Psychiatry, Terrassa, Spain

2

Fundació Clínic, Recerca Biomèdica, Barcelona, Spain

3

Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras,

Madrid, Spain

Corresponding author.

Our aim is to discuss the notion of freedom in severe depression.

We will address it considering several phenomenological concep-

tions of the matter, from Binswanger’s

nicht können

to more recent

Ratcliffe’s loss of existential feelings and also by clinging to our own

clinical experience, in particular a case of melancholic depression

in a 67-year-old woman.

Our patient suffered a clear melancholic syndrome, with an intense

psychomotor inhibition, she felt uncapable of doing anything, spent

hours brooding over menial tasks and thought much about dying,

because she sensed the world as being devoid of possibilities and

the future closed, experiences she considered “not related to dis-

ease” but to her own “

incurable moral failure

”.

In order to discuss the notion of freedom in depression, we will

particularly focus on one of her psychopathologic phenomena,

the empoverishment delusion-like experience of having run-out

of proper clothing, which we consider was based on a inhibited

“perception” of reality, an unreflective experience of corporeal “not

being able”, a loss of the motivational force of intentionality. How-

ever, we will argue that this unreflective, pre-given experience

showed striking connections to the patient’s sub-depressive per-

sonhood, a classical Tellenbach’s

typus melancholicus

.

An hermeneutical analysis of her existence will be performed using

the anthropologic person-centered dialectic model developed by

one of the authors, and building on it, we will introduce the dis-

tinction between lived experience (

Erlebnis

) and factual experience

(

Erfahrung

) whichwe consider it is essential to enlighten the nature

of the loss of freedom that severe depression entails.

Disclosure of interest

The authors have not supplied their decla-

ration of competing interest.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2016.01.1881